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Rohbraugh and deRosset (2004) propose a ‘new’ argument for the necessity of 
origin. The argument has 2 premisses, (T-IND) and (OU) below, which, when 
combined with the (necessity of the) necessity of distinctness, entail the necessity 
of origin. 
 
(T-IND): Necessarily, given a table, T1, made from a hunk, H1, for any table, 
T which might be made from a hunk, H2, distinct from H1, it is also possible 
that both T1 is a table made from H1 and T2 is a table made from H2 
(Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.714). 
 
(OU): Necessarily, if T1 is a table made from H1 and T2 is a table made from 
H2 and H1 H2, then  T1 T2 (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.715). 
 
The justification for (T-IND), according to Rohbraugh and deRosset, is what they 
call ‘the independence principle’: 
 
(IP): ‘processes that turn hunks into tables seem to enjoy a form of 
independence from one another.  A process that turns one hunk into a table 
need not interfere with any other’ (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.711). 
 
Cameron (2005) proposed an interpretation of Kripke’s footnote 56 argument for 
the essentiality of origin (Kripke 1980, p.114, fn.56) which is strikingly similar to 
the argument given by Rohbraugh and deRosset1, and we think that the criticisms 
that were raised there, as  
well as some others, apply to Rohbraugh and deRosset’s ‘New Route’. Cameron 
                                               
1 Rohbraugh and deRosset acknowledge their debt to Kripke’s footnote (Rohbraugh and 
deRosset 2004, p.706, fn.1 and p.712, fn.12), but are careful not to directly attribute 
suggested that the crucial premise in Kripke’s argument was that the ability to 
make a particular table from a particular hunk of wood cannot be affected by the 
making of any particular table from some other (wholly distinct) hunk of wood. 
(This corresponds to (IP).) Kripke’s argument for the necessity of origin was then 
reconstructed as follows. If table T1 is in fact made from hunk H1 then T1cannot be 
made from a distinct hunk H2, for that would inhibit the possibility of making T1 
from H1, since tables made from distinct hunks of wood must themselves be 
distinct. (This corresponds to the premise (OU).) So T1 must be made from H1; and 
since we are dealing with arbitrary tables and hunks the necessity of origin follows. 
Cameron’s problem was this: there are two ways to understand the principle that 
the ability to make a particular table from a particular hunk of wood cannot be 
affected by the making of any particular table from a distinct hunk. There is a weak 
reading of the claim, which we will refer to as the No Limitation of Possibilities 
principle, (NLP) below: 
 
(NLP): If it is possible to make a table T1 from H1 then no matter what table 
(if any) is made (in a given world) from H2 it should still be possible (from 
that world) to make T1 from H1. 
 
And there is a stronger reading, corresponding to (T-IND), that says that if it is 
possible to make T1from H1 then it is possible to make T1from H1 and make any 
table from H2 that can be made from H2. We think that nothing Rohbraugh and 
deRosset have said in support of (IP) motivates the (T-IND) reading, but we grant 
that the motivation for (IP) supports (NLP). 
There is also a third possible reading of (IP), a generalised compossibility claim 
(GC); and we are also granting that this reading is supported by intuitions 
underlying (IP). 
 
(GC): If it is possible to make a table from H1 and it is possible to make a 
table from H2 then it is possible both to make a table from H1 and a table 
from H2. 
 
What are our reasons for saying that (IP) does not support (T-IND)? To motivate 
(IP), Rohbraugh and deRosset first motivate the locality of prevention thesis by 
                                                                                                                        
their argument to him. 
asking the following question: ‘What does it take to prevent the production of a 
particular material object from a particular hunk of raw material?’ (Rohbraugh and 
deRosset 2004, p.706). Let T1be a table, and H1 the hunk of matter from which 
T1originated. The answer they offer is that ‘each factor which prevents T1 from 
eventuating makes a difference to H1 or the people and tools involved in the 
productive effort’ (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.707). This is the sense in 
which they claim that the preventions are local. The locality of prevention thesis, 
then, is a claim about what prevents T1 from originating from the particular hunk 
H1; it is not a general claim about what prevents T1 from coming into existence at 
all.2 Thus, locality of prevention does not rule out the possibility that T1 originates 
from a distinct process in a world in which it has been prevented from originating 
from H1; that is, 
 
(*) The intuitions supporting the locality of prevention thesis are compatible with 
intuitions for the contingency of origins. 
 
To understand further the locality of prevention thesis, we need to introduce a 
distinction between prevention and exclusion. Rohbraugh and deRosset do not 
want to rule out that the same process may give rise to different entities3: ‘Running 
the process which actually leads from H1 to T1 in the presence of factors which do 
not locally infringe can still lead to T1’ (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.708, our 
emphasis), but it needn't do so.  They add ‘All that is promised by the locality of 
prevention is that T1 might still be the product in such a case. But, for all the 
principle tells us, it also might not’ (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p708). This 
requires a distinction between preventing T1 originating from H1, and excluding T1 
originating from H1. If the process has not been infringed upon, but the outcome is 
T3 instead of T1h, nothing prevents T1from originating from H1, meaning that it 
would still be possible to produce T1 from H1. The origination of T3 from H1, 
however, excludes T1 originating from H1, meaning that the actuality of producing 
                                               
2  The question ‘What prevents T1 from originating from H1?’ can only be assumed to be 
equivalent to the question ‘What prevents T1 from originating at all?’ if we assume 
that H1 is the only possible origin for T1. To assume this would be to presuppose the 
Necessity of Origin (intended conclusion), and thus we think it is important to make it 
explicit all the time that the locality of prevention is a thesis about what it takes to 
prevent a given entity originating from a given process. 
3  Their approach, after all, is meant to be different in kind to those that use the 
sufficiency of origin to prove the necessity of origin.  
T1from H1 depends on the non-actuality of having produced T3 from H1. Two 
things seem to follow from Rohbraugh and deRosset’s lack of commitment to the 
sufficiency of origins (SO). First, it is essential to the notion of prevention that it 
involves a change in the world other than a mere haecceitistic switch4. Second, 
there is, on their approach, room for exclusion without prevention.5  
 
Let ‘Hi*’ refer to the process6 of making a table from hunk Hi, and <Hi*, Tj> be 
the ordered pair of the process and its outcome. Since the notion of prevention 
essentially involves infringement upon the process, the locality of prevention thesis 
can only ground a principle stating independence of any two processes. (GC), re-
stated now, is such a principle. 
 
(GC): If it's possible to make a table from H1 and it is possible to make a 
table from H2 then it is possible both to make a table from H1 and a table 
from H2. 
 
But the locality of prevention thesis does not motivate Particularized 
Compossibility, (PC) below; a principle stating independence of any two ordered 
pairs of processes and outcomes. 
 
(PC): Any two ordered pairs of processes and outcomes, < H1*, T1> and < H2*, 
T2>, are compossible. 
 
We have already seen why Rohbraugh and deRosset do not want to be committed 
to (PC). Given their non-commitment to (SO), there might be cases in which two 
ordered pairs exclude one another (without prevention). These are the cases in 
which H1*= H2*, but T1 T2. That is: same process, different outcome. 
We have already argued for (*): the claim that the intuitions supporting the locality 
of prevention thesis are compatible with intuitions for the contingency of origins. 
This is to say that such a thesis is compatible with a different kind of exclusion; 
                                               
4  As they say: ‘any case in which some factor prevents the production of T1 from H1 
must differ from actual circumstances with respect to properties of either H1 or other 
elements of the process by which T1 actually emerged’  (Rohbraugh and deRosset 
2004, p707). 
5  As would be the case if sufficiency of origins was false.  
6   Processes must be individuated independently of their outcomes, otherwise (SO) is 
trivially true. 
namely, that in which T1= T2, but H1* T2 *: same outcome, different process. 
The first kind of exclusion is the one Rohbraugh and deRosset want to leave open 
so as not to be committed to (SO). The second kind of exclusion is the one they 
need to leave open, in order not to beg the question.  
 
(T-IND) is in between (GC) and (PC) in strength. We clearly see how locality of 
prevention supports (GC). We have seen that Rohbraugh and deRosset intend the 
locality of prevention not to establish (PC), given that they do not want to rule out 
the first kind of exclusion above. But we don’t see how the locality of prevention 
can motivate a middle course independence principle like (T-IND), compatible 
with the first kind of exclusion, but incompatible with the second. 
(T-IND) says that, given the pair < H1*, T1> then, given any process H2*, it 
happens that any pair < H2*, x> such that x is a possible outcome of H2* is 
compossible with < H1*, T1>. This implies the impossibility of < H2*, T1>. But, 
according to our (*), its possibility is not ruled out by the locality of prevention, 
and hence not by any independence principle grounded on it. 
Thus (T-IND) is stronger than what can be supported by locality of prevention 
(thus by (IP)); and it is stronger in an objectionable way. Our objection is that it 
begs the question; for the extra strength that (T-IND) has with respect to (GC) can 
come only from assuming the necessity of origin. 
 
Rohbraugh and deRosset make an attempt at addressing this worry. They write that 
‘someone who wants to claim that we can make H2 into T1 needs to explain why 
we could not also run the process which in fact turned H1 into T1 or why that 
process could not result in T1’ (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.716). This is the 
wrong challenge. Given the truth of (NLP) we think that you could still run the 
process, and it could still result in T1; both are possibilities in that world. However 
the actuality of making H2 into T1 excludes the actuality of making H1into T1. They 
also say that ‘Either sort of explanation would appear to violate the locality of 
prevention’ (Rohbraugh and deRosset 2004, p.716). This is not so. As we have 
argued, locality of prevention is a thesis supporting the independency of processes. 
If we make H2into T1, the locality of prevention ensures that we can still, in that 
world, make H1 into a table: no violation here. Exclusion of the second kind 
ensures then that such a table will not be T1: but there is no violation here either; it 
is simply a case of exclusion without prevention. 
 
Although it is true that the kind of exclusion that the non-sufficiency of origins 
requires is different from that required by the contingency of origins, we see no 
reason why the second kind should be more problematic than the first. Since 
Rohbraugh and deRosset must allow for exclusions of the first kind, and since the 
second kind no more violate the locality of prevention than the first, we do not see 
how they can rule out the second without assuming that one of the pairs involved is 
impossible (in the example above < H2*, T1>), which would simply be to beg the 
question.7 
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